Escaping violence — Post-conflict stability and reconstruction

(Advanced Seminar of International Relations, 6 ECTS)

Spring 2020

Instructor:	Cosima Meyer	**Time:**	Thursdays, 10:15 − 11:45
E-mail:	cosima.meyer@uni-mannheim.de	**Room:**	B 318 (A5,6 Bauteil B)

Office hours: Upon request. Please contact me via e-mail (including a short description of your problem or question).

Course description: During the past fifty years, the world witnessed an increasing number of civil wars. They are often long-lasting and hard to solve. Once they are settled, they have a high chance to recur. In fact, settling conflict is not just swiping the switch from war to peace but rather a demanding and tedious process. How can we ensure that these countries remain stable? Why do some countries suffer from recurring conflict? To answer these and other pressing questions, the course takes a multi-perspective approach and discusses various important aspects such as conflict characteristics, politics, economics, culture, and external interventions.

Besides the content-based input, this course prepares students to write term papers and incorporates writing as part of the learning process. The readings and class discussions should encourage students already during the semester to think critically about appropriate topics for their final paper. Students work continuously, in guided steps, on their final papers.

To give them a good overview of important data sets, we will also present and discuss parts of the existing data basis.

The course language is English.

Learning objectives: The goal of this course is to give students a comprehensive overview of actors and tactics in armed conflicts. By the end of the seminar, students should be able to critically discuss research designs and come up with their own research ideas. Since the grade for the course is based on a written scientific term paper, the readings and class discussions should encourage you already during the semester to think critically about appropriate topics for your final paper.

The specific learning objectives that students will achieve by the end of the course are:

- Analyze and critically discuss academic literature

- Relate academic literature to "real world examples" by gaining case study insights and further knowledge through newspaper articles and practical simulations

- Become accustomed to discussing and debating issues in large and small groups

- Experience writing as an important component of the scientific process and progress

- Conceptualize an academic study and write a seminar paper detailing the research question, theory, hypotheses, and methodology

- Increase knowledge and interest in conflict studies

Important Deadlines:

1) Data presentation .... Respective week (in class)
2) Research question .... 05.03.2020 (ILIAS)
3) Research proposal .... 16.04.2020 (ILIAS)
4) Position paper for the simulation .... 14.05.2020 (in class)
5) Term paper .... 30.06.2020 (ILIAS)

Submissions (2), (3), and (5) must be handed in electronically via ILIAS at 23:59 (the latest) on the respective day.

The position paper (4) need to be submitted in-class after the simulation.

Giving a brief presentation of the dataset (1) is expected to happen in-class.

Late submission policy: Late submissions will not be accepted. If there are any (severe) problems in meeting the deadlines, I expect you to discuss the issues with me *in good time beforehand.*

Plagiarism: The University's minimum penalty for plagiarism is failing the course. Cheating or plagiarism can lead to expulsion from the University of Mannheim. Your written assignments will be checked for plagiarism.

Grading policy: The examination regulation of the University of Mannheim differentiates between coursework ("Studienleistung" or "SL") and examination ("Prüfungsleistung" or "PL"). Coursework is graded as 'passed' or 'failed'. It is defined as a required preliminary coursework and thus necessary for the admission to an examination. *Please keep in mind: without successfully passing the coursework, there is no admission to the final examination.* The final examination is assessed at the end of the semester and is graded according to the grading scheme of the University of Mannheim (for further information please see your examination regulations, in particular §12(2), §13(a), §17; http://bit.ly/2hNyxTS).

1. Data presentation (pass/fail)

2. Research question (pass/fail)

3. Research proposal (pass/fail)

4. Position paper for the simulation (pass/fail)

5. Term paper (graded)

   You find all essential information on general requirements in the Appendix in the section "Assessment criteria".

Class attendance and participation: The learning process of this class is based on in-class discussion and participation. Attendance and careful preparation of the course material is therefore expected. This includes coming to class on time.

The number of readings is limited and, in return, I expect you to read the assigned texts carefully and critically. Reading and understanding is a crucial ability for research. I recommend to conduct this task with the aid of a reading guide (I uploaded an example on ILIAS).

Laptop and phone policy: In order to ensure an active participation and to keep your attention on the important things (our class), please avoid distracting yourself and others through electronic devices. For further insights on the consequences of multitasking, I recommend the study by Bellur, Nowak, and Hull (2015) (https://bit.ly/2GnyTf2). They found that in-class multitasking leads to significantly lower performance.

Interesting links: As an additional input, I recommend to follow the news regularly and strongly encourage you to refer to them during the class discussions. Besides the newspapers, I also recommend to follow the political science blogs "Monkey Cage", "Political Violence @ a Glance", Christopher Blattman's blog, the talks at "The McMillan Report", or the app "The Economist Espresso" (gives you a daily morning briefing).

DataCamp: As part of this course, you will get access to a six-months free premium access for DataCamp. DataCamp allows you to improve and broaden your knowledge (coding, data management, plotting, statistical analysis, …) but are also encouraged to use it beyond the course for your own personal learning development. You can easily take courses in R, Python and SQL through a combination of short expert videos and hands-on-the-keyboard exercises. There are more than 100 courses by expert instructors on topics such as importing data, data visualization or machine learning.

Schedule

Week 1	Feb 13	**Introduction to the seminar and organizational issues & Scientific working**	*The double session will take place in room B 318 (A5, 6 Bauteil B) at 8:30-11:45.*
	Feb 13	**Conflict and post-conflict stability — Understanding terms and concepts of the seminar**	
Week 2	Feb 19	**LaTeX workshop**	*The session will take place in room B 243 (A5, 6 Bauteil B) at 17:15-18:45.*
	Feb 20	**Coming out of violence — How much does former conflict matter?**	
Week 3	Feb 27	**Who gets a piece of the pie? Power-sharing agreements**	
Week 4	Mar 05	**From rebels to politicians — Transforming conflict actors to political actors**	
Week 5	Mar 12	**Risky business — Economic factors in post-conflict countries**	
Week 6	Mar 19	**Friends and foes — How to overcome divides in post-conflict societies?**	
		*There is **no** class on March 26, April 2, April 9, and April 16.*	
Week 11	Apr 23	**External intervention — Doing more harm than good?**	
		*There is **no** class on April 30 and May 7.*	
Week 14	May 14	**Simulation — UN Security Council I**	*The sessions will take place in room 008.2 (B6, 30-32 Bauteil E-F) at 8:30-13:30.*
	May 14	**Simulation — UN Security Council II**	
	May 14	**Simulation — UN Security Council III**	
		*There is **no** class on May 21.*	
Week 16	May 28	**Semester wrap-up and final discussion**	

Course outline:

The readings consist of journal articles, book chapters, and working papers. If appropriate, I will also add some other (non-scientific) articles. They should serve as supplementary "real-life" examples. All *required readings* will be uploaded on ILIAS.

⇒ *Note, only the readings marked as "Required readings" are mandatory readings.*

Session 1 (13.02.2020): Introduction to the seminar and organizational issues & Scientific working

This session will introduce you to the seminar in general, give a brief outline of the course, address organizational issues, and discuss the basics of scientific working.

No readings for this session.

The session will take place in room B 318 (A5, 6 Bauteil B) at 10:15-11:45.

Session 2 (13.02.2020): Conflict and post-conflict stability – Understanding terms and concepts of the seminar

Before we can start with the substantial part of our course, we need to define the underlying concepts. Thus, this week aims at clarifying the concepts of conflict, post-conflict, and post-conflict stability. The assigned readings by Collier (2008) and Gates, Nygård, and Trappeniers (2016) introduce you to conceptual questions of conflict and conflict recurrence.

An additional blog post in the Washington Post offers three potential explanations for recurring conflicts.

Guiding questions: *What is a conflict? What are different types of conflict? How do we define civil wars? What is the 'conflict trap'? What are ways to 'escape the conflict trap'? Why do civil wars recur?*

Required readings:

☐ Collier, Paul (2008). *The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it.* Oxford University Press, USA, Chapter 2 ("Conflict trap").

☐ Gates, Scott, Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv, and Trappeniers, Esther (2016). "Conflict recurrence". *Conflict Trends* 2: 1–4

Optional readings:

∗ Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward (2010). "Civil war." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3–57

∗ Cunningham, David E., Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Salehyan, Idean (2016). "Trends in civil war data: Geography, organizations, and events." In: Mason, T. David and McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara. *What do we know about civil wars?* Rowman & Little: 247–260

∗ Mason, David T., Gurses, Mehmet, et al. (2011). "When civil wars recur: Conditions for durable peace after civil wars". *International Studies Perspectives* 12(2): 171–189

∗ Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Melander, Erik, and Urdal, Henrik (2016). "Introduction – Patterns of armed conflict since 1945." In: Mason, T. David and McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara. *What do we know about civil wars?* Rowman & Little: 15–32

∗ Kibris, Arzu (2015). "The conflict trap revisited: Civil conflict and educational achievement". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(4): 645–670

∗ Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Vasquez, John A (2013). *Conflict, war, and peace: An introduction to scientific research.* CQ Press

∗ Schoon, Eric W. (2018). "Why does armed conflict begin again? A new analytic approach". *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 59(5-6): 480–515

∗ Suhrke, Astri and Samset, Ingrid (2007). "What's in a figure? Estimating recurrence of civil war". *International Peacekeeping* 14(2): 195–203

Session 3 (19.02.2020): LaTeX workshop

This LaTeX workshop includes a quick introduction, hands-on practices and a template for your term papers and theses*. The aim is to provide you with sufficient knowledge to write (future) term papers with the template and to cope with common problems in LaTeX. However, there is no need to write your term paper with LaTeX. I personally experienced that using LaTeX is way more efficient than using Word (or any other text processing program) and want to introduce you to this idea.*
The workshop is co-organized with Dennis Hammerschmidt.

Please bring a charged laptop and an old term paper (digital version).

The session will take place in room B 243 (A 5, 6 Bauteil B) at 17:15-18:45.

No readings for this session.

There will be a blog post on a similar tutorial on MZES Methods Bites soon.

Session 4 (20.02.2020): Coming out of violence – How much does the former conflict matter?

As of this week, we delve into the core topic of this course: various factors that can affect post-conflict stability. Starting with conflict-related factors, we discuss how these factors influence conflict recurrence. The end of the conflict appears to matter. Most studies agree that a decisive victory is more likely to produce post-conflict stability than a negotiated settlement. But why is this the case? The underlying logic shows a congruent picture: If there is a decisive victory, the opponent shows key information about its strength (Mukherjee 2006) and may thereby discourage a renewed attack. Besides, the loser's group structure is destroyed and it is thus more difficult to re-mobilize (DeRouen 2014). The readings by Mason, Gurses, et al. (2011) and Toft (2010) further explore possible conditions for post-conflict stability by taking the outcome of the conflict into account.

The opinion piece published in the New York Times discusses how Nigeria is still "haunted by its civil war".

Guiding questions: *To which extent does the previous conflict matter? What is multiple/dual sovereignty? Which one tends to be more stable – settlements vs. victories? And why?*

Presentation: *UCDP "universe" (UCDP 2019)*

Required readings:

☐ Caplan, Richard and Hoeffler, Anke (2017). "Why peace endures: an analysis of post-conflict stabilisation". *European Journal of International Security* 2(2): 133–152

☐ Mason, David T., Gurses, Mehmet, et al. (2011). "When civil wars recur: Conditions for durable peace after civil wars". *International Studies Perspectives* 12(2): 171–189

Optional readings:

∗ Mattes, Michaela and Savun, Burcu (2010). "Information, agreement design, and the durability of civil war settlements". *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 511–524

∗ DeRouen Jr, Karl, Bercovitch, Jacob, and Pospieszna, Paulina (2011). "Introducing the civil wars mediation (CWM) dataset". *Journal of peace research* 48(5): 663–672

∗ Hancock, Landon E (2008). "The Northern Irish peace process: from top to bottom". *International Studies Review* 10(2): 203–238

∗ Nathan, Laurie and Toft, Monica Duffy (2011). "Civil war settlements and the prospects for peace". *International Security* 36(1): 202–210

∗ Quinn, J. Michael, Mason, T. David, and Gurses, Mehmet (2007). "Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence". *International Interactions* 33(2): 167–193

∗ Toft, Monica Duffy (2009). *Securing the peace: the durable settlement of civil wars.* Princeton University Press

∗ Toft, Monica Duffy (2010). "Ending civil wars: a case for rebel victory?" *International Security* 34(4): 7–36

∗ Trumbore, Peter F (2018). ""The Movement Moves Against you": Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process". *Terrorism and political violence* 30(3): 524–543

Session 5 (27.02.2020): Who gets a piece of the pie? Power-sharing agreements

Looking at power sharing pacts, research builds upon the theory of credible commitments. Military and territorial pacts are assumed to be costlier and thus more credible than, for instance, political pacts. This assumption is supported by several quantitative studies. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) argue that power sharing may also serve as a provision for including rebels and thus decrease

the danger of spoilers. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) analyze whether the implementation of power-sharing agreements leads to sustainable peace. By differentiating between political, military and territorial power-sharing provisions, they find support for the positive effect of military and territorial power-sharing agreements. Almost a decade later, Gates, Graham, et al. (2016) further disaggregate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing agreements. Using a novel dataset, they find support that constraining power-sharing institutions have a positive effect on durable peace. The article in the New York Times shows you an example of a recent power-sharing deal that has been reached between military and civilian leaders in Sudan.

Guiding questions: *What is a power-sharing agreement? What does a political, military, and territorial pact regulate? How effective are power-sharing agreements? Why are credible commitments important? What is a credible commitment?*

Presentation: *Power-Sharing Event Data (Ottmann and Vüllers 2014)*

Required readings:

☐ Gates, Scott, Graham, Benjamin A. T., et al. (2016). "Power sharing, protection, and peace". *The Journal of Politics* 78(2): 512–526

☐ Jarstad, Anna K. and Nilsson, Desirée (2008). "From words to deeds: The implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(3): 206–223

Optional readings:

∗ Gent, Stephen E (2011). "Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflicts". *International Interactions* 37(2): 215–228

∗ Haass, Felix and Ottmann, Martin (2017). "Profits from peace: The political economy of power-sharing and corruption". *World Development* 99: 60–74

∗ Hartzell, Caroline, Hoddie, Matthew, and Rothchild, Donald (2001). "Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables". *International Organization* 55(1): 183–208

∗ Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2003). "Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and post-civil war conflict management". *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318–332

∗ Hartzell, Caroline A and Hoddie, Matthew (2007). *Crafting peace: Power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars*. Penn State Press

∗ Hartzell, Caroline A and Hoddie, Matthew (2015). "The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post—Civil War Democracy". *World Politics* 67(1): 37–71

∗ Hartzell, Caroline A and Hoddie, Matthew (2019). "Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War". *International Studies Quarterly* 63: 641–653

∗ Hoddie, Matthew and Hartzell, Caroline (2003). "Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements". *Journal of Peace Research* 40(3): 303–320

∗ Jarstad, Anna K. (2009). "The prevalence of power-sharing: exploring the patterns of post-election peace". *Africa Spectrum* 44(3): 41–62

∗ Lie, Tove Grete, Binningsbø, Helga Malmin, and Gates, Scott (2007). "Post-conflict justice and sustainable peace." World Bank: Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 5

∗ Martin, Philip (2013). "Coming together: power-sharing and the durability of negotiated peace settlements". *Civil Wars* 15(3): 332–358

∗ Ottmann, Martin and Vüllers, Johannes (2014). *Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) (Version: 1.0.0)*. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. URL: http://doi.org/10.7802/69

∗ Ottmann, Martin and Vüllers, Johannes (2015). "The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): A new dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries". *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(3): 327–350

∗ Pospieszna, Paulina and Schneider, Gerald (2013). "The Illusion of 'Peace Through Power-Sharing': Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War". *Civil Wars* 15(sup1): 44–70

∗ Stedman, Stephen John (1997). "Spoiler problems in peace processes". *International Security* 22(2): 5–53

∗ Strøm, Kaare W. et al. (2017). "Inclusion, dispersion, and constraint: Powersharing in the world's states, 1975–2010". *British Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 165–185

Session 6 (05.03.2020): From rebels to politicians – Transforming conflict actors to political actors

Former rebel groups often turn into political actors after the end of civil wars. In this session, we further explore why this is the case, how these actors affect post-conflict politics, and why it might be essential to include former fighting factions in the government. The article by Dresden (2017) analyzes why some former armed actors are more successful in post-conflict politics than others.

Sindre (2016) disaggregates further and addresses intra-party democracy of former rebel groups. She asks under which conditions former rebel groups successfully transform into democratic political parties. As an additional input, the article published in The Conversation gives you more insights into one recent example where a rebel group turned into a political party: Colombia's FARC.

Guiding questions: *Why are some post-conflict incumbents to dominate politics? Which former rebel groups are more likely to have intra-party democracy? What could we call a successful rebel party transformation? Why might it be important to include former fighting factions in the government?*

**Presentation:** *Non-state armed (NSA) actors dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013)*

Required readings:

☐ Dresden, Jennifer Raymond (2017). "From combatants to candidates: Electoral competition and the legacy of armed conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34(3): 240–263

☐ Sindre, Gyda Marås (2016). "Internal party democracy in former rebel parties". *Party Politics* 22(4): 501–511

Optional readings:

∗ Arjona, Ana, Kasfir, Nelson, and Mampilly, Zachariah (2015). *Rebel governance in civil war.* Cambridge University Press

∗ Arjona, Ana (2016). *Rebelocracy.* Cambridge University Press

∗ Berti, Benedetta (2016). "Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict, resistance and co-existence." *Civil Wars* 18(2): 118–136

* Cunningham, David E., Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Salehyan, Idean (2013). "Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 516–531

* Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2017). "Rebels & legitimacy; an introduction." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28(4-5): 669–685

* Gade, Emily Kalah, Hafez, Mohammed M., and Gabbay, Michael (2019). "Fratricide in rebel movements: A network analysis of Syrian militant infighting." *Journal of Peace Research*: 1–15

* Huang, Reyko (2016). *The wartime origins of democratization: Civil war, rebel governance, and political regimes.* Cambridge University Press

* Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2007). "Demobilization and reintegration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(4): 531–567

* Ishiyama, John and Batta, Anna (2011b). "Swords into plowshares: The organizational transformation of rebel groups into political parties." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44(4): 369–379

* Ishiyama, John and Marshall, Michael (2015). "Candidate recruitment and former rebel parties". *Party Politics* 21(4): 591–602

* Ishiyama, John and Batta, Anna (2011a). "Rebel organizations and conflict management in post-conflict societies 1990–2009". *Civil Wars* 13(4): 437–457

* Ishiyama, John and Widmeier, Michael (2013). "Territorial control, levels of violence, and the electoral performance of former rebel political parties after civil wars". *Civil Wars* 15(4): 531–550

* Ishiyama, John (2016). *Introduction to the special issue "From bullets to ballots: the transformation of rebel groups into political parties"*

* Ishiyama, John and Marshall, Michael (2017). "What explains former rebel party name changes after a civil conflict ends? External and internal factors and the transition to political competition". *Party Politics* 23(4): 364–375

* Justino, Patricia and Stojetz, Wolfgang (2017). "On the legacies of wartime governance." *Unpublished manuscript.* `https://bit.ly/2omxpHL`.

* Manning, Carrie and Smith, Ian (2016). "Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war". *Democratization* 23(6): 972–989

* Marshall, Michael Christopher and Ishiyama, John (2016). "Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?" *Democratization* 23(6): 1009–1025

* McDonough, David S. (2008). "From guerrillas to government: Post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda". *Third World Quarterly* 29(2): 357–374

* Taleski, Dane (2011). "From bullets to ballots: Guerrilla-to-party transformation in Macedonia". In: *Central European University Political Science Seminar. Central European University.(Elections in Macedonia 2006)*

* Tonchev, Plamen (2005). "From bullets to ballots and beyond: building post-conflict democracies in Asia and Europe". *Asia Europe Journal* 3(3): 379

Session 7 (12.03.2020): Risky business – Economic factors in post-conflict countries

As we know from our previous session, countries coming out of conflict are often caught in a cycle of poor performance (Collier 2008; Sachs and Warner 1999). The so-called 'development traps' can be the reason for this situation; and one such trap is conflict (Collier 2008). The conflict trap implies that developing countries are more likely to

experience violence (Appel and Loyle 2012; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008) and, once there was a conflict, they are also more likely to fall back into conflict again because existing "risk factors are likely to have persisted" (Bigombe, Collier, and Sambanis 2000, 325). Post-conflict countries are thus, due to their fragility and uncertainty, not favored targets of international companies. But how do these countries attract investment that may help them to boost their economic growth? This is the central focus of the paper by Garriga and Phillips (2014) who argue that foreign aid can be a credible signal to other investors. Goodhand (2008) focuses on arising challenges by the drug economy in Afghanistan. For an additional input, I recommend the article "No One Wants to Help Bashar al-Assad Rebuild Syria" published by The Atlantic.

Guiding questions: *Why are post-conflict countries not favored targets of investment? How can these countries overcome insecurity and provide credible signals? What are other reasons why investors would be interested in investing in post-conflict countries?*

Presentation: *World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank 2019)*

Required readings:

☐ Garriga, Ana Carolina and Phillips, Brian J. (2014). "Foreign aid as a signal to investors: Predicting FDI in post-conflict countries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(2): 280–306

☐ Goodhand, Jonathan (2008). "Corrupting or consolidating the peace? The drugs economy and post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan". *International Peacekeeping* 15(3): 405–423

Optional readings:

∗ Anderson, Mary B. (1999). *Do no harm: how aid can support peace–or war*. Lynne Rienner Publishers

∗ Appel, Benjamin J. and Loyle, Cyanne E. (2012). "The economic benefits of justice: Post-conflict justice and foreign direct investment." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(5): 685–699

∗ Chandler, David (2015). "Rethinking the conflict-poverty nexus: From securitising intervention to resilience". *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4(1)

∗ Collier, Paul et al. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy.* World Bank Publications

∗ Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, and Söderbom, Måns (2008). "Post-conflict risks." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 461–478

∗ Collier, Paul (2009). "Post-conflict recovery: How should strategies be distinctive?" *Journal of African Economies* 18: i99–i131

∗ Diehl, Paul F. (2016). "Breaking the conflict trap: The impact of peacekeeping on violence and democratization in the post-conflict context." In: Mason, T. David and McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara. *What do we know about civil wars?* Rowman & Little: 139–156

∗ Del Castillo, Graciana (2008). *Rebuilding war-torn states: The challenge of post-conflict economic reconstruction.* OUP Oxford

∗ Fearon, James D., Humphreys, Macartan, and Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2009). "Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia." *American Economic Review* 99(2): 287–91

∗ Goodhand, Jonathan, Dennys, Christian, and Mansfield, David (2012). "A Dangerous Peace? Drugs, Post-Conflict State Building and Horizontal Inequalities in Afghanistan". In: *Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development.* Springer: 249–274

∗ Kang, Seonjou and Meernik, James (2004). "Determinants of post-conflict economic assistance". *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2): 149–166

∗ Quinn, J. Michael, Mason, T. David, and Gurses, Mehmet (2007). "Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence". *International Interactions* 33(2): 167–193

∗ Sachs, Jeffrey, McArthur, John W, et al. (2004). "Ending Africa's poverty trap". *Brookings papers on economic activity* 2004(1): 117–240

∗ Toh, Kiertisak and Kasturi, Prahlad (2012). "Foreign aid in post-conflict countries: The case of South Sudan". *Journal of Global South Studies* 29(2): 201

Session 8 (19.03.2020): Friends and foes – How to overcome divides in post-conflict societies?

Besides infrastructure and other – easily measurable components – trust is often eroded during civil wars. While the importance of trust has been widely acknowledged, research has often neglected this important aspect. Wong (2016) analyzes how political trust can be built after a civil war in Sierra Leone. De La O and Wantchekon (2011) examine, within a different setting, how distrust can be overcome in post-civil war Rwanda. They make use of a unique lab-in the field experiment. The Opinion piece in the New York Times gives you more insights into an unfortunate example of societal distrust and conflict: Israel and Palestine.

Guiding questions: *What type of trust can be important in post-conflict settings? How can we establish trust? Why is trust important? Why do you think has trust been neglected so far in research on post-conflict environments?*

**Presentation:** *Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015)*

Required readings:

☐ De La O, Ana L. and Wantchekon, Leonard (2011). "Experimental research on democracy and development." *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*: 384–396

☐ Wong, Pui-Hang (2016). "How can political trust be built after civil wars? Evidence from post-conflict Sierra Leone". *Journal of Peace Research* 53(6): 772–785

Optional readings:

∗ Annan, Jeannie et al. (2011). "Civil war, reintegration, and gender in Northern Uganda." *Journal of conflict resolution* 55(6): 877–908

∗ Blattman, Christopher and Annan, Jeannie (2010). "The consequences of child soldiering." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 882–898

∗ Boothby, Neil, Crawford, Jennifer, and Halperin, Jason (2006). "Mozambique child soldier life outcome study: Lessons learned in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts." *Global public health* 1(1): 87–107

∗ Fearon, James D., Humphreys, Macartan, and Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2009). "Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia." *American Economic Review* 99(2): 287–91

∗ Mironova, Vera and Whitt, Sam (2016). "The evolution of prosociality and parochialism after violence". *Journal of Peace Research* 53(5): 648–664

∗ Mironova, Vera and Lazarev, Egor (2013). "Minority status and investment: Evidence from natural and lab experiments in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Unpublished manuscript. https://bit.ly/2NrXcsy.*

∗ Schauer, Elisabeth and Elbert, Thomas (2010). "The psychological impact of child soldiering." In: *Trauma rehabilitation after war and conflict.* Springer: 311–360

∗ Vogt, Manuel et al. (2015). "Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327–1342

∗ Whitt, Sam and Wilson, Rick K. (2007). "The dictator game, fairness and ethnicity in postwar Bosnia." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 655–668

Session 9 (23.04.2020): External intervention – Doing more harm than good?

A crucial problem that arises in post-conflict periods is how to make credible commitments. Both articles for today's session analyze how to master this challenge from different perspectives: the composition of UN peacekeeping troops (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016) and the combined utility of mediation and UN peacekeeping (DeRouen Jr. and Chowdhury 2018).

The Monkey Cage blogpost by Allard Duursma further sums up the research on what can undermine peacekeeping missions.

This week, we will get some practical insights from Afghanistan by our guest researcher. You will also have the chance to ask questions of interest during the Q&A – so please be prepared!

Guiding questions: How are UN peacekeeping troops composed? When does the UN decide to deploy peacekeeping operations? How effective – and under which conditions – are these troops in settling conflict and sustaining peace?

Presentation: *Data on United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments (Kathman 2013)*

Required readings:

☐ DeRouen Jr., Karl and Chowdhury, Ishita (2018). "Mediation, peacekeeping and civil war peace agreements". *Defence and Peace Economics* 29(2): 130–146

☐ Hultman, Lisa, Kathman, Jacob D., and Shannon, Megan (2016). "United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace". *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(3): 231–249

Optional readings:

∗ Amicarelli, Elio and Di Salvatore, Jessica (2020). *Introducing the PeaceKeeping Operations Corpus (PKOC)*. URL: https://go.aws/31Hz6SS

∗ Bara, Corinne (2020). "Shifting targets: The effect of peacekeeping on postwar violence". *European Journal of International Relations*

∗ Berdal, Mats (2017). *Building peace after war*. Routledge

∗ Diehl, Paul F. (2016). "Breaking the conflict trap: The impact of peacekeeping on violence and democratization in the post-conflict context." In: Mason, T. David and McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara. *What do we know about civil wars?* Rowman & Little: 139–156

∗ Dorussen, Han and Ruggeri, Andrea (2017). "Peacekeeping event data: Determining the place and space of peacekeeping". *International Peacekeeping*: 32–38

∗ Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations.* Princeton University Press

∗ Druckman, Daniel and Wagner, Lynn (2017). "Justice matters: Peace negotiations, stable agreements, and durable peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: 287–316

∗ Dumas, Lloyd J. (2011). "The economics of peacekeeping." In: Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. *The handbook on the political economy of war.* Edward Elgar: 589–606

∗ Easterly, William and Easterly, William Russell (2006). *The white man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good.* Penguin

∗ Fortna, Virginia Page (2004). "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–292

∗ Fortna, Virginia Page and Howard, Lise Morjé (2008). "Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature". *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 11: 283–301

∗ Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Sandler, Todd, and Shimizu, Hirofumi (2009). "Demands for UN and non-UN peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus voluntary contributions to a public good". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6): 827–852

∗ Gaibulloev, Khusrav, George, Justin, et al. (2015). "Personnel contributions to UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions: A public goods approach". *Journal of Peace Research* 52(6): 727–742

∗ Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Montgomery, Alexander H. (2006). "Power positions: International organizations, social networks, and conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 3–27

∗ Heldt, Birger and Wallensteen, Peter (2011). "Peacekeeping operations: Global patterns of intervention and success, 1948-2004." *Unpublished manuscript. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899505*.

∗ Hegre, Håvard, Hultman, Lisa, and Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv (2018). "Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations". *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 215–232

∗ Hoeffler, Anke (2014). "Can international interventions secure the peace?" *International Area Studies Review* 17(1): 75–94

∗ Hultman, Lisa (2013). "UN peace operations and protection of civilians: Cheap talk or norm implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1): 59–73

∗ Hultman, Lisa, Kathman, Jacob D., and Shannon, Megan (2014). "Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108(4): 737–753

∗ Hultman, Lisa (2020). *Is the responsibility to protect dead? The view from Libya.* URL: https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/02/10/is-the-responsibility-to-protect-dead-the-view-from-libya/

∗ Jetschke, Anja and Schlipphak, Bernd (2019). "MILINDA: A new dataset on United Nations-led and non-united Nations-led peace operations." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*: 1–25

∗ Joshi, Madhav and Darby, John (2013). "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989–2007". *Peacebuilding* 1(2): 256–274

∗ Karreth, Johannes and Tir, Jaroslav (2012). "International institutions and civil war prevention." *The Journal of Politics* 75(1): 96–109

∗ Kathman, Jacob D. (2013). "United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 532–549

∗ Khanna, Jyoti, Sandler, Todd, and Shimizu, Hirofumi (1998). "Sharing the financial burden for UN and NATO peacekeeping, 1976-1996". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 176–195

∗ Levin, Andrew (2019). "Peacekeeper fatalities and force commitments to UN operations." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*: 1–24

∗ Mattes, Michaela and Savun, Burcu (2009). "Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3): 737–759

∗ Mikulaschek, Christoph (2010). "The United Nations Security Council and the responsibility to protect: Policy, process, and practice." *Unpublished manuscript.* `https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618890`.

∗ Mukherjee, Bumba (2006). "Does third-party enforcement or domestic institutions promote enduring peace after civil wars? Policy lessons from an empirical test". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2(4): 405–430

∗ Mironova, Vera and Whitt, Sam (2017). "International peacekeeping and positive peace: Evidence from Kosovo". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(10): 2074–2104

∗ Nilsson, Desirée (2008). "Partial peace: Rebel groups inside and outside of civil war settlements." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 479–495

∗ Pushkina, Darya (2006). "A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission". *International Peacekeeping* 13(2): 133–149

∗ Quinn, J. Michael, Mason, T. David, and Gurses, Mehmet (2007). "Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence". *International Interactions* 33(2): 167–193

∗ Regan, Patrick M., Frank, Richard W., and Aydin, Aysegul (2009). "Diplomatic interventions and civil war: A new dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 135–146

∗ Sandler, Todd (2017). "International peacekeeping operations: Burden sharing and effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(9): 1875–1897

∗ Shannon, Megan (2009). "Preventing war and providing the peace? International organizations and the management of territorial disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(2): 144–163

∗ Stojek, Szymon M. and Tir, Jaroslav (2015). "The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states." *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2): 352–376

∗ Stojek, Szymon M. and Chacha, Mwita (2015). "Adding trade to the equation: Multilevel modeling of biased civil war interventions." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(2): 228–242

∗ Ward, Hugh and Dorussen, Han (2016). "Standing alongside your friends: Network centrality and providing troops to UN peacekeeping operations." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(3): 392–408

Session 10, 11 & 12 (14.05.2020): Simulation – UN Security Council

These sessions host a simulation of the UN Security Council on Somalia. As part of this, I ask you to prepare your inaugural speeches and your position papers. You have the chance to experience the processes and complexities of negotiations and apply previously learned knowledge throughout the rounds of debate. The book chapter describes how the UN Security

Council's meetings are conducted and familiarizes you with the fundamental proceedings and rules of the game.

The simulation sessions will take place in room 008.2 (B 6, 30-32 Bauteil E-F) at 8:30-13:30.

Required readings:

☐ Sievers, Loraine and Daws, Sam (2014). *The procedure of the UN Security Council.* Oxford University Press, Chapter 5 "Conduct of meetings and participation"

Optional readings:

∗ Barash, David P. and Webel, Charles P. (2017). *Peace and conflict studies.* Sage Publications, Chapter 9 "The decision-making level", pp. 205-224

∗ Hurd, Ian (2019). *International organizations: Politics, law, practice.* Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3 "The United Nations I: Law and Administration"

∗ Hurd, Ian (2019). *International organizations: Politics, law, practice.* Cambridge University Press, Chapter 4 "The United Nations II: International Peace and Security"

Session 13 (28.05.2020): Semester wrap-up and final discussion

This week, we will have a final discussion and deal with potential challenges of your term papers. If you have any further questions or would like to discuss something particular, please feel free to contact me beforehand.

No readings for this session.

Assessment criteria

Coursework

1. Data presentations

The data presentations should give you a broad overview of potential data sources that are common in the various sub-fields of conflict studies.

The data presentations should not be longer than 10 minutes (**maximum**) with slides (PowerPoint, LaTeX (PDF), or Prezi) and a handout for the rest of the class.

Deadline: Respective week

Formal requirements: 10 minutes presentation with slides, 1-page handout

Submission:

- Handout (to be uploaded on ILIAS)

- Presentation (in-class, in the respective session)

Should be included:

- What is the data about?

- What is the unit of analysis and the time frame?

- How was the data collected?

- What could you do with the data? (Come up with some descriptive analysis or present some paper where the data set was already used.)

- Where can I access the data? (Reference, format)

- Brief concluding discussion

2. Research question

The goal of this seminar is both to provide you a broad insight into the literature on post-conflict stability and post-conflict reconstruction and to enable you to write a complete empirical term paper.

I therefore ask you to submit your research question and I will provide you with feedback afterwards.

A good starting point to do so may be going through the syllabus and check both scientific articles (skim abstracts), read attached newspaper articles, and/or read news in general for inspiration.

Deadline: March 05, 2020 (23:59)

Submission: On ILIAS

Should be included:

- Analytical research question

- (You may also add a few explanatory sentences.)

3. Research proposal

To give you the chance to think already early about your final project, I ask you therefore to submit a research proposal, building upon your research question that you have already submitted in April.

Deadline: April 16, 2020 (23:59)

Formal requirements: 1000 words (+/- 10% tolerance), Times New Roman, 1.5 line spacing, font size 12

Submission: As PDF on ILIAS

Should be included:

– Research question

– Explain why this question is interesting (motivation)

– Briefly review the state of the art

– Elaborate on your theoretical assumptions

– Elaborate how you would like to analyze your question

4. Position paper for the simulation

The position paper is the core part that helps you to maneuver through the simulation. It serves as a glossary that you may want to consult when needed. You should therefore spend a sufficient time for preparation and address the required points thoroughly. I also provide you with a good example for a position/policy paper on ILIAS.

Deadline: May 14, 2020

Formal requirements: 1500 words (+/- 10% tolerance), Times New Roman, 1.5 line spacing, font size 12

Submission: In-class (at the simulation), to be submitted as a hard copy after the simulation

Should be included:

- Background information (1 paragraph)
    - Briefly summarize background information
    - Identify and define key terms
- Analysis (1 paragraph)
    - Analyze past international actions
    - Which past actions were already taken?
    - Identify who could be a potential ally?
- Policy positions – Position your country/organization policy (*Put the emphasis of your position paper on this section!*)
    - Go through the resolution draft step by step
    - Address paragraphs and positions – Can you support the initiative/claim? If so, why? Or why not? Come up with credible arguments!
    - Address possible solutions
- References

The position paper serves as a basis for the **inaugural speech** that you are expected to deliver at the beginning of the simulation.

The inaugural speeches give you some space to present yourself (your country or your organization) at the beginning of the simulation **50 seconds (max.)**. As part of this, you want to briefly deliver the key points of your policy positions to all present members at the UN Security Council. This means that you have to present yourself briefly and make your position clear. The inaugural speech should contain **all** arguments.

Final examination

Term paper

The deadline for the term paper (in English) is June, 30 2020 (23:59; upload on ILIAS as PDF). For the purpose of consistency, please use a *coherent citation style* (see for example the APSA citation guidelines (uploaded on ILIAS) or Mannheim's "Arbeitshilfen-Reader" (also uploaded on ILIAS; unfortunately only in German)).

General requirements

1. Formal requirements

   - Cover page: university, chair, semester, course type and title, name of the instructor, title of the term paper, date; name, contact information, program and semester of the student; indicate word count

   - Table of contents: complete structure of the final paper including page numbers and informative headlines

   - Length: 20 pages in total (max. 4,000 words (+/- 10% tolerance), will be checked); 4,000 words include only the content (*no* cover page, table of content, references, or appendices)

   - Signed statutory declaration (both in English and in German, as uploaded on ILIAS)

   - Layout: 1.5 line spacing, font size 12, Times New Roman, pagination of the text

   - Orthography and grammar

   - Formatted as a PDF

2. Scientific standards

   - Appropriate use and formal correctness of references, e.g. for example according to APSA or Mannheim's citations style (as uploaded on ILIAS)

   - Independent research

   - List of references: coherent citation style, e.g. for example according to APSA or Mannheim's citations style (as uploaded on ILIAS).

Content

1. Introduction

   - Relevance

   - Analytical research question

- Overview of the paper's structure

2. Theoretical part

   2.1 Literature Review

      - Overview of the state of the art research in the literature
      - Critical discussion of the literature

   2.2 Theory and Hypotheses

      - Definition of key terms
      - Theoretical argument and argumentative structure
      - Generating hypotheses

3. Empirical part

   3.1 Research Design

      - Discussion of sample and time span/case selection
      - Discussion operationalization
      - If you are conducting a quantitative analysis: brief model justification and regression diagnostics

   3.2 Discussion

      - Testing hypotheses
      - Description and visualization of empirical findings; if you are conducting a quantitative analysis please also upload your do-files/R-files, Excel-files and data set(s) as well
      - Interpretation of results

4. Conclusion

   - Summary and critical discussion
   - Answering the research question
   - Outlook

The following illustration provides you an example how the cover page and a good structure of a term paper could look like:

University of Mannheim
Chair of Political Science/International Relations
Spring 2020
Advanced Seminar in International Relations:
Escaping violence — Post-conflict stability and reconstruction
Instructor: Cosima Meyer

TITLE OF TERM PAPER

Date

Your Name

Your Contact Info
Your Program
Semester You Are Enrolled

Word Count: X,XXX

Table of Content

The section titles are just examples of what should be included in the text - if you prefer, you are of course welcome to change the headlines (content should remain the same)